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95 N.C. L. REV. 1784 (2017)

CHASING CAUSATION: THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT’S AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT DECISION AND PROPER CAUSATION
STANDARDS*
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (the “ADA”) twenty years ago,1 the question of what causation
standard is required for discrimination claims has created
disagreement among lower courts. Some courts require that a
“motivating factor” standard must be met, meaning a plaintiff need
demonstrate only that prohibited discrimination contributed to the
employer’s decision.2 Other courts employ a “but-for” causation
standard, which necessitates a showing that but for a plaintiff’s
disability she would not have been fired.3 Recently, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals became the first circuit to analyze which standard
must be adopted under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008,4 which prohibits discrimination “on the
basis of” disability.5
In Gentry v. East West Partners Management Co.,6 the Fourth
Circuit held that the ADA mandated application of the more
stringent “but-for” causation standard,7 meaning a plaintiff must
prove that but for her disability, the employer would not have taken
* © 2017 Adrianna G. Sarrimanolis.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012)).
2. Johnathan R. Mook, Fourth Circuit Adopts “But-For” Causation for ADAAA
Claims, 16-5 Bender’s Lab. & Emp. Bull. (MB) 03 (May 1, 2016) (explaining that under a
‘motivating factor’ standard, “to establish liability, a plaintiff need demonstrate only that
prohibited discrimination contributed to the employer’s decision.”).
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
266 (5th ed. 1984) (defining but-for causation as: “[t]he defendant’s conduct is a cause of
the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the
defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without
it.”).
4. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). In this Recent Development, “the ADA” refers to
both the original 1990 Act and the 2008 Amendments, as they are applied as one body of
law.
6. 816 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2016).
7. See infra Part II.
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adverse employment action against her.8 The court reasoned that
Supreme Court precedent, prior decisions by other circuit courts, and
the legislative history of the ADA all support the conclusion that the
“on the basis of” language suggests a “but-for” causation
requirement.9
This Recent Development argues that the “but-for” causation
standard used by the Fourth Circuit is the incorrect standard and,
instead, proposes using the “motivating factor” standard. The
argument focuses on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for its decision in
Gentry by examining the text of the ADA, the legislative history of
the ADA, and relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and other
circuits.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses the
history of the ADA causation standards with a specific focus on how
the standards have developed and changed over the last twenty years.
Part II provides the factual background for the Fourth Circuit’s
adoption of a “but-for” causation standard. Part III analyzes and then
explains why the “but-for” causation standard is not the proper
standard a plaintiff must meet to assert a claim of discrimination by
looking to the text and history of the ADA and relevant decisions of
the Supreme Court and other circuits. Part IV examines the policy
outcome when using the “but-for” causation standard and the
negative impacts it has on implementing the purpose of the ADA.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARDS AND THE ADA
The ADA was enacted in 1990 “[t]o establish a clear and
comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
disability.”10 Especially in a context as “critical” as employment,
individuals with disabilities were seen as pervasively disadvantaged
through “outright intentional exclusion[;] the discriminatory effects of
. . . communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to
lesser . . . benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.”11 The ADA was
therefore created with the intent to both remedy this discrimination,

8. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235.
9. Id. at 235–36.
10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
11. Id. §2(a)(3), (5).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1784 (2017)

1786

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

and to “assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”12
Originally, to set forth a viable claim under section 102(a) of the
1990 ADA, a disabled job applicant or employee had to show that an
adverse employment action was taken against her “because of the
disability of such individual.”13 This language mirrored the language
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which stated
that it was an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer to
discriminate against any individual “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.”14
Interpretations of the “because of” language in Title VII helped
establish the original standard applied in ADA cases. In the seminal
case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,15 the United States Supreme Court
dictated the causation standard associated with the “because of”
language in Title VII.16 Despite the Court’s inability to form a
majority, six justices agreed that in a status-based discrimination case
under Title VII, a plaintiff could prevail if he could show that one of
the prohibited traits was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the
employer’s decision.17 Because the decision involved language
identical to that of the ADA, lower courts began applying the
motivating factor causation standard to discrimination claims brought
under the ADA after its enactment one year later.18
Two years after Price Waterhouse was decided, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII to codify the new
causation framework dictated by the Supreme Court.19 The new
provision stated that an “unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice.”20
12. Id. § 2(a)(8).
13. Id. § 102(a).
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964)) (emphasis added).
15. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
16. Id. at 239–40.
17. See id. at 241.
18. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We
hold that the ‘because of’ component of the ADA liability standard imposes no more
restrictive standard than the ordinary, everyday meaning of the words would be
understood to imply. In everyday usage, ‘because of’ conveys the idea of a factor that
made a difference in the outcome.”).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
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This statutory change, however, actually led to more
interpretational confusion in lower courts regarding causation
standards. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,21 the Supreme
Court held that Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard, which
provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice,”22 could not be
carried over to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (the “ADEA”),23 which prohibits employers from
“discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s age.”24
Unsurprisingly, this decision led to conflict among lower courts
as they struggled to determine what this meant for claims brought
under the ADA, which also mirrored the “because of” language of
the ADEA.25 Based on Gross, a number of circuit courts held that the
motivating factor standard would no longer apply to ADA claims.26
Instead, in order to state a viable claim of disability discrimination, a
plaintiff would have to apply the more stringent “but-for” causation
standard.27
However, even before Gross, the ADA causation standard was
in a constant state of flux due to changes to the ADA. In 2008,
Congress amended the ADA.28 The most notable change to the
21. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
23. The ADEA referenced in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. is the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). See Gross, 557
U.S. at 169. This Act deems it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The “because of” language in the ADEA is the
same language used in the ADA, causing some courts to hold that the treatment of one act
must mirror the treatment of the other. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327, 331–32.
24. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(a) (“No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual . . . .”).
26. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]e see no reason to insert the one addendum (‘solely’) or the other (‘a motivating
factor’) into the ADA.”); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 957 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“The ADA did not authorize mixed-motive disability discrimination claim.”).
27. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 312; Serwatka, 591 F. 3d at 957.
28. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). Congress amended the ADA in response to a
number of Supreme Court cases that were narrowly defining what constituted a disability
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ADA, for purposes of this Recent Development, was the change in
the language in § 102. While the original 1990 text employed the same
“because of” language found in Title VII, the 2008 amendment
modified the text to prevent discrimination “on the basis of” the
disability.29 Thus, this pivotal change in language resulted in the need
for a new analysis of what causation standard the ADA requires.
Eight years later, with its decision in Gentry, the Fourth Circuit
became the first circuit court to address what the appropriate
causation standard should be given the new language of the ADA,30
and it held that the “but-for” causation standard applied to ADA
claims.31
II. GENTRY V. EAST WEST PARTNERS MANAGEMENT CO.
The Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to evaluate the ADA
causation standard issue when considering Judith Gentry’s challenge
to a district court’s jury instructions under the ADA.32 Gentry sued
her employers Maggie Valley and East West for disability
discrimination under the ADA, among other violations.33 She claimed
she was terminated because of an ankle injury she had sustained while
on the job.34 The Western District of North Carolina instructed the
jury that Gentry must be able to demonstrate that her disability was
the but-for cause of her termination in order to establish a claim of
discrimination under the ADA.35 Accordingly, the jury found for
Maggie Valley and East West on the disability discrimination claims

under the act. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002) (holding that terms “substantially” and “major” in the definition of disability under
the ADA must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that the
coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability needs to be narrowly
construed). Congress intended the amendments to force courts to “carry out the ADA’s
objectives of providing ‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination’ by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the
ADA.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(1).
29. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 5(a).
30. Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2016).
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id. at 233.
33. Id. at 232–33. The other violations Gentry alleged were sex discrimination under
Title VII and North Carolina common law and retaliation for pursuing a workers’
compensation claim in violation of North Carolina law. Id.
34. Id. at 232.
35. Id. at 233.
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because it did not find that but for Gentry’s disability she would not
have been fired.36
On appeal, Gentry argued that the district court had improperly
instructed the jury on the causation standard for disability
discrimination claims under the ADA.37 She argued the jury should
have adopted the “motivating factor” causation standard of Title VII
instead of the “but-for” standard used.38 Under the “motivating
factor” standard, an unlawful employment action is established when
the complainant demonstrates that her disability was a “motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”39 However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s jury instructions, finding that a “but-for” causation
standard is the proper standard for a plaintiff to establish a viable
claim of discrimination under the ADA.40
The Fourth Circuit came to this conclusion despite the language
change in the 2008 amendments to the ADA, asserting that the new
“on the basis of” language was essentially identical to the removed
“because of” language.41 Although the Fourth Circuit was the first
circuit to decide the causation standard under the new ADA
language, it closely followed several previous Supreme Court and
other circuit court decisions, reasoning that such precedents “dictate[]
the outcome.”42
The Fourth Circuit also focused on the text and legislative
history of the ADA, stating that such language “calls for a ‘but-for’
causation standard” and the legislative history “does not suggest that
‘on the basis of’ was intended to mean something other than ‘but-for’
causation.”43 Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this
causation standard set a higher bar for plaintiffs, it nonetheless found
that the legislative history of the ADA “suggests the language was
changed to decrease the emphasis on whether a person is disabled,
not to lower the causation standard.”44

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 235.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234.
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 236.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION STANDARD
The Fourth Circuit’s rationale for adopting the “but-for”
causation standard focused on three main conclusions: (1) the ADA’s
“on the basis of” disability language calls for using a “but-for”
causation standard; (2) the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the ADA and its 2008 amendment leads to the
conclusion that the change in language to “on the basis of disability”
was not intended to establish a “motivating factor” causation
standard; and (3) looking to the text of the ADA, there is no text that
“provide[s] that a violation occurs when an employer acts with mixed
motives.”45 Through this analysis, the Fourth Circuit became the first
circuit court to decide that “on the basis of” disability entails a “butfor” causation standard.
A. “On the Basis of” Disability Textual Analysis
While other circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gross as signifying that a “but-for” causation standard
must be applied to ADA discrimination claims, with its decision in
Gentry, the Fourth Circuit became the first—and only—circuit to
make such a holding when interpreting the ADA’s “on the basis of”
language.46
Congress’s 2008 amendments to the ADA included a change in
the language used in section 102 providing the “General Rule” for
discrimination.47 Prior to 2008, the ADA stated: “No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual . . . .”48 The 2008
amendments to the ADA changed this language to read that one shall
not “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability.”49
Because the amendment to the text of the statute was the
impetus for Gentry, the textual difference was the Fourth Circuit’s
first consideration. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that there was
“no meaningful textual difference” between “because of” and “on the
45. Id. at 235–36.
46. See Mook, supra note 2; see also Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d
312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 959 (7th
Cir. 2010).
47. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3557
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)).
48. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat.
327, 331.
49. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 5(a).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1784 (2017)

2017]

CAUSATION STANDARDS UNDER THE ADA

1791

basis of.”50 The court looked to the New Oxford American and
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary definitions of “basis”51 and determined
that a “basis” is merely the “justification for or reasoning behind
something.”52 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit claimed the “on the basis
of” language exactly mirrored the previous “because of” language.53
However, when looking at the full definition of “basis” provided
by Merriam-Webster online, it is defined as “the bottom of something
considered as its foundation” or “the principal component of
something.”54 This definition neither leads to the automatic
assumption that “because of” and “on the basis of” have the same
definition, nor the determination that it indicates a sole cause
analysis. The use of the words “foundation” and “component”
indicate that when something is a “basis,” it is one part of a whole—
not a “sole”55 cause. Therefore, this definition seems to lean towards
an interpretation that a disability must only be a contributing cause,
as opposed to a but-for cause.56
With this analysis, the Fourth Circuit determined that Congress’s
2008 amendment resulted in no meaningful difference in the statutory
terms of the ADA.57 Yet it seems incredibly unlikely that Congress
would have changed this language for no purpose. As noted in the
Sixth Circuit’s ADA causation analysis, “[d]ifferent words usually
convey different meanings . . . .”58 Given the importance of, and
weight given to, the language used in a statute when determining
what causation standard to apply in the previous court decisions cited

50. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236.
51. Id. at 236 (citing Basis, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); On
the basis of, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ADVANCED LEARNER’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(2008) (defining “on the basis of” as “according to[,] based on”)).
52. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236.
53. Id. at 235–36.
54. Definition of Basis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/basis [https://perma.cc/39Z8-7CNE].
55. Definition of Sole, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/sole [http://perma.cc/KB7S-2GRZ] (“belonging exclusively or otherwise
limited to one usually specified individual, unit, or group”).
56. See Corey Stein, Comment, Mixed-Motive Jury Instructions Under the ADA and
ADAAA: Are they Still Applicable in the Wake of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar?, 44 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1223, 1251 (2014) (“[T]he plain language of the phrase ‘on the basis of’ is
significantly broader than the phrase ‘because of’ . . . .”).
57. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36 (“We see no ‘meaningful textual difference’
between this language and the terms ‘because of’ . . . .”).
58. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012).
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by the Fourth Circuit,59 the Fourth Circuit’s brief, two-sentence
analysis of this point appears deficient.60
To strengthen its argument, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that
the amendments to the ADA occurred prior to the decision in Gross,
which held that the “because of” language in the ADEA required a
“but-for” causation standard.61 Since Gross had not yet been decided,
the court reasoned, Congress’s 2008 amendment to the ADA cannot
be said to have been an effort to avoid a “but-for” causation
standard.62 The relevance of this argument, however, seems
questionable given that the ADEA has a “because of” standard,
which the Fourth Circuit interpreted as having the same exact
meaning as the “on the basis of” language. And more importantly,
this chronology does not preclude an argument that the change in
language was meant to prevent an application of a “but-for”
causation standard, as Congress could have had other reasons other
than the decision in Gross for enacting such change.
B.

Legislative History of the 1991 ADA

Aside from a brief mention of the legislative history behind the
2008 ADA amendments, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Gentry
largely ignored the legislative history of the original 1991 ADA.63 The
Fourth Circuit likely overlooked this analysis due to its quick
determination that “on the basis of” exactly mirrored “because of”
language and, therefore, a “but-for” causation standard was
applicable.64
In fact, the legislative history that the Fourth Circuit cited
explains why the “on the basis of” language implies a causation
standard less than “but-for” causation. In its analysis, the Fourth
Circuit briefly looked to the legislative history of Congress’
enactment of the amended language to the ADA.65 In that history,
Congress explicitly stated that such amendments were undertaken to

59. This seems particularly true given the amount of weight and how closely the
Fourth Circuit followed the Supreme Court decision in Gross, which is a decision that was
almost entirely based on the analysis of the ADEA’s “because of” language. See Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 480 U.S.
228, 240–42 (1989); Lewis, 681 F.3d at 312.
60. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36; see also Stein, supra note 56, at 1251.
61. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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ensure[] that the emphasis in questions of disability
discrimination is properly on the critical inquiry of whether a
qualified person has been discriminated against on the basis of
disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question
of whether a particular person is a “person with a disability.”66
From this passage alone, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the only
overarching goal of amending the ADA was to “decrease the
emphasis” courts had previously placed on whether someone has a
disability.67 Therefore, this change in language should not be
interpreted as an attempt to “lower the causation standard.”68
However, this short passage overlooks other key provisions in
the ADA’s text and legislative history. First, another provision in the
amended ADA states that one of the purposes of the amendments
was to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under
the ADA.”69 Yet, the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the ADA
calls for a “but-for” causation standard appears to go against this
explicitly stated purpose.70 Because a “but-for” causation standard is
more difficult to establish than a motivating factor standard, this test
imposes a significantly greater burden on plaintiffs alleging
discrimination based on their disabilities who will feel the burden of
the “but-for” causation standard. As a result, fewer plaintiffs will be
able to effectively establish their claims, and many victims of
discrimination may choose not to file suit in the first place. The scope
of the ADA will not have been broadened, but instead narrowed, as
fewer people claiming discrimination based on their disability will be
protected by the courts.
Additionally, the House Report associated with this change in
language states that
the bill amends Section 102 of the ADA to mirror the structure
of nondiscrimination protection in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, changing the language of Section 102(a) from
prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual “with a
disability because of the disability of such individual” to

66. 154 CONG. REC. S8843 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (statement of Senate Managers)
(providing the purpose and summary of the legislation, in addition to explanations of the
bill, how the law applies to the legislative branch, and a regulatory impact statement).
67. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236.
68. Id.
69. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 (emphasis added).
70. Id. § 2(a)(4). For full analysis of why a “but-for” causation standard does not
provide for a “broad scope” of protection, see infra Part IV.
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prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual “on the
basis of disability.”71
This language indicates that the intent of Congress was to broaden
the scope of ADA protection. Not only would a “but-for” causation
standard make it increasingly difficult for ADA claims to be brought72
in contrast to Congress’s intent of broadening the scope of protection
through its amendments to the ADA,73 but determining that “on the
basis of” is the equivalent to “because of” statutory language conflicts
with the House Report. The change in language was meant to “mirror
the structure of nondiscrimination protection” under Title VII, which
employs the motivating factor” standard.74 By holding that “on the
basis of” requires but-for causation, the Fourth Circuit directly
contravened Congress’s clear intent to apply the motivating factor
causation standard to the ADA. This oversight indicates that the
Fourth Circuit should have more thoroughly analyzed the legislative
history,75 particularly given the arguably ambiguous language of the
amendments to the ADA and the importance of the precise statutory
language to the court’s analysis.76
Additionally, the context in which the ADA was enacted is also
indicative of this same congressional intent. The ADA was enacted
merely one year after the 1989 Price Waterhouse decision established
that the “because of” language in Title VII required a motivating
factor causation standard.77 Consequently, when choosing the
wording of the ADA, Congress was aware that the Supreme Court
had interpreted the “because of” language to establish a motivating
factor causation standard with respect to Title VII. Thus, Congress’s
decision to use identical language to that of Title VII further bolsters
the likelihood the ADA was enacted to establish the same motivating
factor standard analyzed in Price Waterhouse.78

71. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008).
72. See infra Part IV.
73. Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2016).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008).
75. United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (“Where the
language and purpose of the questioned statute . . . [is] ambiguous, the judiciary may
properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion.”).
76. See supra Section III.A (explaining how the “on the basis of” language could have
been construed to mean something other than “but-for” causation which the Fourth
Circuit did not consider).
77. Price Waterhouse was decided in 1989 and the ADA was originally enacted in
1990. See supra Part I.
78. Id.
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This conclusion is further evidenced by the amendments made to
Title VII in 1991. Congress amended Title VII to explicitly state that
a motivating factor standard should be used, statutorily linking the
ADA and Title VII.79 A 1990 House Report about the amendments
to Title VII and the ADA stated:
[a] bill is currently pending in the Judiciary and Education and
Labor Committees, H.R. 4000, which would amend the powers,
remedies and procedures of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Because of the cross-reference to title VII in Section 107,
any amendments to title VII that may be made in H.R. 4000 or
in any other bill would be fully applicable to the ADA.80
This of course suggests that Congress knew these amendments were
being made to Title VII and fully intended, through the statutory link
between the two statutes, that the “motivating factor” causation
standard apply to the ADA.81 Since Congress intended for the
motivating factor standard to apply to the ADA when it was first
enacted, this strongly suggests that a motivating factor standard is
what Congress had always intended for the ADA.
In sum, the Fourth Circuit only undertook an analysis of one part
of the legislative history relating to the ADA, not fully examining
Congress’ intent behind the amendments and ignoring any other
relevant legislative history. Had it fully examined such history, the
court could have uncovered the House Reports, the legislative history
surrounding the implementation of the ADA in 1990, the
amendments to Title VII in 1991, and the legislative history of the
2008 amendments to the ADA noted above.
While these congressional materials do not definitely establish a
particular causation standard for ADA cases, they at least tend to
lean away from the use of a “but-for” causation standard. Therefore,
the brevity and lack of depth to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the
legislative history of the ADA does not allow for a complete and
proper analysis of what causation standard should be used under the
new ADA. The assumption that the new language did not require any
additional analysis prevented the Fourth Circuit from fully exploring
what “on the basis of” means and how legislative history should
inform what causation standard should be applied. However, even

79. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234.
80. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 471; see also infra Section III.C.
81. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
471.
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accepting the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress merely
intended the “on the basis of” language to mirror “because of”
language, the court still should not have applied a “but-for” causation
standard for other reasons.
C.

Precedent and the Lack of Motivating Factor Language

Another major influence that led the Fourth Circuit to require a
“but-for” causation standard was the lack of “motivating factor”
language in the 2008 ADA amendments.82 This conclusion was largely
based upon Gross, in which the Supreme Court held that the
ADEA’s “because of” language did not explicitly provide that a
plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply
a “motivating factor,” as the statute included “because of” language.83
The Gross Court also noted that Congress did not add a “motivating
factor” provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII, leading
the Court to conclude that “when Congress amends one statutory
provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally.”84
In support of its heavy reliance on Gross, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had previously applied
Gross to ADA claims and found that the “motivating factor”
standard of Title VII could not be applied to such claims.85 According
to the Sixth Circuit, “[s]hared statutory purposes do not invariably
lead to shared statutory texts, and in the end it is the text that
matters,” and thus, because the text of the ADA makes no mention
of a “motivating factor,” the causation standard from Title VII could
not be read into the statute.86 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that
“given the lack of a provision in the ADA recognizing mixed-motive
claims, such [mixed motive finding] claims do not entitle a plaintiff to
relief for disability discrimination.”87 However, like the Fourth Circuit
in Gentry, neither of these courts considered the fact that the ADA
includes a cross-reference to the substantive provisions of Title VII—
that the ADEA does not—and merely adopted their ADA analysis
from a case analyzing the ADEA.

82. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234 (“We conclude that Title VII’s ‘motivation factor’
language cannot be read into Title I of the ADA.”).
83. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
84. Id. at 174.
85. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234.
86. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2012).
87. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2010).
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The Fourth Circuit used the criteria espoused in Gross to
determine whether the amended ADA required a “but-for” causation
standard.88 The court held that the “motivating factor” causation
standard could not be applied because the provisions of the amended
ADA did not explicitly provide that a plaintiff could establish
discrimination by showing that disability was a “motivating factor.”89
Similarly, the Court noted that Congress “contemporaneously
amended” provisions of the ADA at the time the motivating factor
standard was added to Title VII but failed to make any such
amendments to the ADA.90 This analysis, taken from Gross, ignores
important differences between the ADEA and the ADA—an issue
the Supreme Court itself warned against in Gross.91 Whereas the
ADEA was enacted without any cross-reference to the substantive
provisions of Title VII, the ADA has such a cross-reference.92 These
factors therefore merit a different approach for ADA cases and
ADEA cases when analyzing the absence of “motivating factor”
language.
The original ADA’s cross-reference to Title VII is significant to
this analysis, as it works to incorporate substantive portions of Title
VII into the amendments to the ADA. This incorporation provides
an important explanation for the lack of “motivating factor” language
in the statute and the lack of amendment of the ADA in 1991. The
ADA’s “enforcement” provision incorporates Title VII, stating: “The
powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in Sections 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 shall be the powers, remedies,
and procedures this subchapter provides . . . to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability . . . .”93 The Fourth Circuit
argued that this merely incorporates Title VII’s “enforcement
provisions” and not the “unlawful employment practices” in § 200e2—the portion of Title VII establishing the “motivating factor”
causation standard.94 But even though § 2000e-2(m) is not directly
incorporated into the ADA, it is incorporated through § 2000e5(g)(2)(B), which states, “[o]n a claim in which an individual proves a
88. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“When conducting
statutory interpretation, ‘we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’ ”).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (containing no crossreferences to the substantive provisions of Title VII).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
94. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235.
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violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor . . . .”95
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the connection to §§ 2000e2(m) through 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) but argued that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
merely incorporates the remedies available under § 2000e-2(m),
holding that to invoke a claim under the ADA “an ADA plaintiff
must allege a violation of the ADA itself.”96 While the Fourth Circuit
makes a valid contention, the mixed motive causation standard used
in Title VII is a stronger argument. For one, if § 2000e-2(m) does not
apply to the ADA, then the link has provided a remedy with no way
to establish liability.97 Arguably, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) only provides
remedies for liability established under § 2000e-2(m).98 This link
Congress created must have been purposeful. If the remedies can only
be applied to violations of § 2000e-2(m), the logical conclusion is that
§ 2000e-2(m) must also be incorporated into the ADA for the
remedies to apply. This would also explain why Congress did not
explicitly include motivating factor language in the ADA if it
intended it to be incorporated through this connection with Title VII.
As for the argument that Congress had a clear opportunity to
amend the language of the ADA at the time it amended the language
in Title VII to include “motivating factor,” the House Report implies
that Congress considered this but determined that it was unnecessary
because any changes made to Title VII would also apply to the
ADA.99 Therefore, the fact that the ADA was not
contemporaneously amended with Title VII does not carry as much
weight in the case of the ADA as it may have had in the ADEA
analysis in Gross. Although there are questions as to what exactly
Congress intended, when cross-referencing the ADA with the
enforcement provision of Title VII, it seems that this cross-reference
was meant to connect the ADA and Title VII in some way—a
reference that does not exist in the ADEA. Based on these facts, in its
analysis of the ADA, the Fourth Circuit too quickly used the
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)/
96. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235.
97. See Stein, supra note 56, at 1241 (“If § 2000e-2(m) was not intended to apply to
the ADA, then there would have been no need to link the ADA to the remedy established
under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) with no means of obtaining the remedy provided therein.”).
98. The statute itself, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), states that “[o]n a claim in which
an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) . . . [,]” which would lead one to
believe that the statute only applies to § 2000e-2(m) violations, not violations of the ADA.
99. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
471.
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standards the Gross Court used in its analysis of the ADEA, given
that the two statutes are inherently different.
IV. HANDLING THE EFFECTS OF A “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION
STANDARD
Due to attempts by advocacy groups, communities, and the
independent living movement to eliminate social barriers for
individuals with disabilities, Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as
the nation’s first civil rights law highlighting the needs of people with
disabilities by explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on disability
in public accommodations, telecommunications, public services, and
employment.100 The ADA was guided by the overarching goal of
assuring “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”101 These
guiding principles were carried into the ADA’s amendment in 2008.102
Aside from the argument that a “but-for” causation standard is not
the appropriate standard based on the text of the statute and its
legislative history, the requirement of a “but-for” causation standard
to establish a claim of disability discrimination would directly
contravene the purpose behind the implementation of the ADA.
The “but-for” causation standard requires more than just
showing that an employer fired an employee because that employee
has a disability.103 While a plaintiff may prove that she was fired due
to her disability, her proven claim is not synonymous with a finding
that she was discriminated against because of her disability, unless she
can prove that she would not have had adverse employment action
taken against her had she not been disabled.104 Not only does this
requirement not comport with the very purposes laid out in the
ADA,105 it seemingly contravenes the policy behind its 2008
100. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat.
328, 328–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
101. Id. § 2(a)(8).
102. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (stating that the purpose of the amendment
was to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA”).
103. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 266 (defining “but-for” causation as follows:
“The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but
for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the
event would have occurred without it.”).
104. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining in detail the difficulty for a
plaintiff trying to establish but-for causation for the adverse employment action taken
against them).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68.
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amendments. Congress was disillusioned with how narrowly the
ADA had been applied in Supreme Court cases and sought to fix the
issues and broaden the scope of protection the ADA would provide
through the 2008 amendments.106
By applying a “but-for” causation standard, the Fourth Circuit
has made plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination based on
disability more difficult to establish. Therefore, the accountability of
employers in making employment decisions is diminished.107 As long
as an employer is able to establish another reason for the termination
of the employee, the fact that discrimination based on an employee’s
disability has occurred becomes a non-issue. Additionally, a plaintiff
is put in a position where she is expected to find “objective evidence
of her employer’s state of mind or internal burdens” to prove “butfor” causation.108 More often than not, it will be close to impossible to
find this evidence, thereby leaving plaintiffs to attempt to make a
“conjectural inquiry of the employer’s thoughts and purposes.”109 The
employer is then in the position to merely reject that the disability
was the but-for cause of any adverse employment actions and offer
any other “subjective” reason for those actions.110 The Supreme Court
itself has acknowledged this issue and seemed to believe that it would
be contrary to our common sense that “Congress meant to obligate a
plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and
illegitimate motivations in the employment decisions [a plaintiff]
challenges.”111 Requiring the “but-for” causation standard puts the
employer in a stronger position than the employee, making it
significantly more difficult to establish a claim of discrimination based
on disability in the workplace. These difficulties will make it harder
106. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(4). For a discussion on why Congress made
amendments to the ADA, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
107. See Brian Joggerst, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Mixed Motives
Claims Under the ADA: Consistent, Congruent, and Necessary, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
1587, 1612 (2014) (arguing that if a “but for” standard is used, an employer who admits to
using forbidden discriminatory factors in its employment decision will not be liable if a
jury thinks that the same decision would have been made absent the forbidden factor).
108. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 323 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989); see also Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 191 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o apply ‘but-for’
causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The answer to this
hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows
less than does the employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the
employer will often be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.”).
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for a plaintiff to make a claim of discrimination based on disability
and may even result in fewer claims being brought.112
The difficulties a plaintiff faces when forced to meet a “but-for”
causation standard would be avoided under a “motivating factor”
standard. The plaintiff would still have to establish the discrimination
but would merely have to show that it was a motivating factor, even if
other factors also led to the adverse employment action.113 Therefore,
a defending employer would not escape liability by merely claiming
an alternative reason for the firing while in court when a motivation
of the termination was the plaintiff’s disability. Given the strong
policy implications behind the enactment of the ADA, which were
strengthened with its 2008 amendments, the “but-for” causation
standard hinders the goals of the ADA. As a result, the Fourth
Circuit has placed a higher burden on those discriminated against
because of their disability than Congress had intended.
CONCLUSION
Although the Fourth Circuit held that a “but-for” causation
standard was the appropriate standard required to establish a claim of
discrimination under the ADA, it is most likely not the causation
standard Congress intended to require for ADA claims. The Fourth
Circuit too quickly dismissed the idea that claims brought under the
amended ADA should be evaluated using a “motivating factor”
standard. Merely brushing aside the change in language that the
amendments implemented, the Fourth Circuit only briefly considered
the legislative history and adhered to holdings in previous court cases,
which linked “because of” language to but-for causation. Whether the
amended language in the ADAAA was meant to mirror “because of”
language or not, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is lacking. Its decision to
hold plaintiffs to a “but-for” causation standard does not comport
with the policy behind the implementation of the ADA. Requiring a
“but-for” causation standard as the Fourth Circuit does will make
plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination based on disability more difficult to
bring, contravening Congress’ intentions of enacting the ADA and
the amendments to it in 2008. A “motivating factor” standard would
provide the protection that Congress intended and persons with
112. Mook, supra note 2 (“The Gentry decision, therefore, represents a significant
victory for employers in fending off ADA claims. Had the Fourth Circuit adopted Title
VII’s ‘motivating factor’ analysis for the ADAAA’s causation standard, a plaintiff would
have to show only that his or her disability was one of the considerations that the
employer took into account when taking an adverse job action.”).
113. See supra Part I.
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disabilities deserve. For these reason, it may be necessary for
Congress to pass another amendment to the ADA clearly laying out
to the lower courts that a “motivating factor” standard is required in
ADA discrimination claims.
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